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THE BANKING CRISIS — A RATIONAL 
INTERPRETATION 
Patrick Minford 
Abstract 
Modern macroeconomic models have been widely 
criticised as relying too much on rationality and market 
efficiency. However, basically their predictions about this 
crisis are being borne out by events. ‘Crashes’ are an 
integral part of an ‘efficient market’ capitalism and are 
brought on by swings in the news about productivity 
growth; this time nearly two decades of strong computer-
based productivity growth were brought to a crashing halt 
by raw material shortages. This presages a slow recovery 
until innovation in material use frees growth up again as it 
did in the 1990s after the shortages of the 1970s. 
he banking crisis of 2007–9 can probably be dated to 
August 2007, when the first bank casualties of the sub-
prime collapse appeared and the interbank market closed 
up, claiming as its first victim the UK’s Northern Rock 
bank. However, many central banks took little offsetting 
action on their official lending rates, confining themselves 
to the provision of liquidity to the interbank market; the 
exception was the US central bank, the ‘Fed’, which was 
coping with the direct fall-out of the sub-prime collapse. 
For the others a dominant feature of 2008 was continued 
worldwide growth at rapid rates accompanied by a sharp 
boom in commodity prices which in turn fed into domestic 
prices. It was not until the Lehman bankruptcy of mid-
September, followed by the collapse and bail-out of AIG 
the next day, that the rest of the world’s central banks went 
into panic monetary easing. They were soon joined by the 
world’s governments in taxpayer bailouts of major banks. 
The fourth quarter saw record risk-premia on loans to firms 
and households, and also a spectacular collapse in output 
and world trade. In the first quarter of 2009 there was a 
further though smaller fall. It now seems as if the second 
quarter has seen some slight recovery in output in several 
major economies; a number of indicators are suggesting 
that this may be the cyclical bottom of the recession 
induced by the crisis. 
This is a short staccato description of the banking crisis. 
Many would disagree with it, especially with the 
assessment of its end; they would say we have yet to see 
further fallout and a ‘double-dip’ cyclical pattern. Of 
course it is possible they are right; hence the words ‘may 
be’ in that paragraph’s last sentence. Nevertheless, at this 
moment (mid-June 2009) it is a fair statement of the facts 
we currently have. 
My aim in the rest of this paper is to assess the causes, and 
say something about cures, but mainly to use available 
macroeconomic models to assess the prospects. Much has 
been written recently in blogs and op-eds about the 
deficiencies of macro-modelling and modellers. However, I 
will argue that both come out of this episode with some 
credit; the macro-modelling community’s forecasts have 
been for a bad but short recession, followed by a moderate 
recovery. They have based this on models that plainly 
could not predict the banking collapse nor analyse banking 
behaviour, but nevertheless were equipped to assess the 
fall-out of the ‘credit crunch shock’ and the massive 
monetary and fiscal response that followed. 
In this respect, they have responded to the crisis much as 
they might have responded to other shocks, such as 
commodity price shocks or the Asian crisis shock, again 
without having good models of the shocks themselves. 
Critics have been eager to seize on the failure of modellers 
to have models of the shocks; yet a macro-model cannot for 
obvious reasons model all the sources of the shocks that hit 
the economy. There is not, nor can be at least with our 
present abilities, such a thing as a ‘complete model’ of all 
sources of disturbance in the world economy. 
Hence in my first section I look at the candidates for 
‘cause’ and ‘cure’ of this crisis. Then in the second I set out 
just why I think that recent macro-models are capable of 
analyzing the effects of the crisis shock and of the 
responses to it. In the third I set out the sort of analysis that 
results. Finally I draw some conclusions. 
Causes and cures of the crisis: 
In a recent lecture in Cardiff Dale Henderson (Henderson, 
2009), who worked at the Fed until the end of 2008, called 
the episode ‘a financial perfect storm’ in which ‘all the 
wrong incentives’ for a variety of agents coincided 
disastrously. This seems to be exactly right. He documents 
the incentives for executives of banks to take bonuses on 
short term gains, for rating agencies to rate well products 
for which they were paid by the issuers, and for the 
originators of primary lending to create products that they 
could easily pass on to bundlers. He could have added that 
politicians too had incentives, in the form of happy voters 
and bulging revenue streams, to encourage lending to ‘sub-
prime’ borrowers and to go easy on regulatory barriers to 
these activities (see Schwartz, 2009). 
All these aspects of the crisis have been well documented 
— Adrian and Shin (2008), Foster and Young (2008) and 
Beenstock (2009) all consider the causes. Undoubtedly all 
played a role. However, human affairs are full of poor 
incentives; yet somehow we assume that market disciplines 
will price their effects fairly. It remains a puzzle that the 
main villains of the piece, sub-prime mortgage packages 
(the famed ‘Collateralised Debt Obligations’), seem to have 
been so badly mispriced. This apparent mispricing lay not 
so much in the slicing of the mortgages but in the failure to 
price into the packages as a whole the apparent systematic 
risk due to the general response of house prices to the 
business cycle. 
The question is whether someone could rationally have 
been expected to win a bet against these products, given the 
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information available before 2007. We know with hindsight 
of course that they would have won this bet. But could that 
have been expected statistically? Or to put the question 
another way: was the behaviour of the US housing market a 
‘bubble’? 
The prosecution case saying ‘yes, it was’ might seem well 
founded, since plainly house prices have collapsed and 
‘fundamentals’ have turned out to be much worse than the 
market price seemed to be discounting. 
A defence case however would have to point out that the 
fundamental in the housing market is ultimately 
productivity, since this drives incomes and demand against 
a scarce supply of land. Productivity in turn most likely 
follows a random walk, since the innovation causing 
productivity growth is largely unpredictable. In the run-up 
to the crisis US real house prices appeared to become a 
non-stationary process — taking off from the late 1990s, 
having previously been stationary and cyclical. 
If real house prices were non-stationary — a variable 
‘integrated of order 1’ or I(1) for short — then their 
conditional forecast is close to the current value and their 
conditional variance say ten quarters ahead equals ten times 
the one-period variance, which was not very great. This 
calculation of systematic risk could be quite modest, as 
compared with one based on the possible fall in a cyclical 
Figure 1: Real US House Prices, 1980Q1 = 100 
All-Transactions Indexes (Estimated using Sales Prices and 
Appraisal Data) 
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Figure 2: A variety of ‘histories’ for the Stock Market (measured by FTSE deflated by CPI) 
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house price close to a cyclical peak, when a recession has a 
large probability. 
We can illustrate this point from the behaviour of another 
asset price, for which ‘bubbles’ are often posited, the stock 
market. Figure 2 shows a variety of ‘histories’ for the UK 
FTSE over the period from the 1970s to the 2000s. Nine of 
them are based on simulations from a model of an efficient 
FTSE market facing a profits fundamental with four 
possible regimes for growth, each with fixed probability.  
(Meenagh et al., 2007). One can find a calibration of this 
model such that it generates behaviour that with 95% 
confidence is like both that of the observed FTSE and of 
observed profits. The tenth chart illustrates this by showing 
the actual FTSE in this period of history. 
What this shows is that asset prices are I(1) variables in 
general, related to other I(1) variables (basically 
productivity), and that their prices can be efficiently set but 
nevertheless have the properties of ex post ‘bubbles’— that 
is, they crash from time to time. 
The policy conclusion from this analysis is a gloomy one: 
‘capitalism’, in which large bets are taken on available 
information, will generate ‘crises’ periodically for 
particular sectors where the bets go wrong after the event. 
Occasionally the sector in question will be or will include 
the banking sector and we will have a banking crisis. Since 
it is generally agreed that we cannot let a banking system, 
or nowadays more broadly a financial system, fail, then 
because the required bail-out is costly to the taxpayer the 
taxpayer will insist on regulation to control the cost when 
the inevitable happens. 
This leads us directly into a discussion of ‘cures’. What can 
be meant by ‘cure’ when the crisis is inevitable (even 
though unpredictable)? We mean measures that can either 
reduce the chances of a banking crisis or reduce the fall-out 
from it. The main cure suggested is, following the logic 
above, regulation of bank risk; we had Basel 1 and then 
Basel II (which was not fully operative at the time of the 
crisis) and some have suggested modifications to Basel II 
such as pro-cyclical risk capital provision. 
Taxpayers clearly have the right to demand such safeguards 
to limit the potential calls on their resources. However, the 
problem does not stop there. We had regulations before this 
crisis but in many countries the politicians saw that they 
were disregarded; thus in the UK the new tripartite system 
of regulation from 1997 gave the Financial Services 
Authority power to control the banks, and the FSA has 
reported in its own defence that it was instructed by the 
government to do ‘light-touch regulation’— i.e. effectively 
it let the UK banks load up risk off-balance sheet with 
impunity. Thus we note that the reappearance in this 
context of the well-known problem of time-inconsistency, 
whereby politicians can be persuaded for short-term 
reasons to override sound previous instructions. Thus ‘quis 
custodiet ipsos custodes?’ — which translated asks: ‘how 
will we keep control of the regulating government itself?’ 
In the area of other policies where this time-inconsistency 
crops up the remedy has been that public opinion should 
discourage politicians from such interfering overrides. For 
example we frown on politicians interfering with 
sentencing in law courts, or nowadays with the setting of 
interest rates. For public opinion to impose this discipline 
on politicians it needs to be both well educated in the issues 
at stake and well informed about the facts. In the case of 
the banking and financial system neither is the case. The 
system is poorly understood (even upmarket newspapers 
can describe financial market participants as ‘greedy’ and 
short-selling as ‘evil’) and as for information it is by law 
restricted to the regulators themselves. As Michael 
Beenstock (ibid) has argued, it is important that regulators 
release this information to the public so that restraint on 
participants from public opinion can be operative. This 
restraint will work directly on the share prices of those 
taking excessive risks and indirectly through the political 
process. 
So while there can be no ‘cure’ in the sense of preventing 
bank crises, there can be some reduction of the taxpayer 
cost when crises occur through regulation of risk-taking 
and through the release of information about the risk-
takers. 
How good are our macro models? 
The crisis has been an occasion for a number of economists 
to rail against the ‘modern generation’ of macro models. By 
this is meant models that assume rational expectations and 
efficient markets, in which people and firms respond to the 
cost of capital, and in which the monetary system is 
modelled in terms of an interest rate-setting rule, whereby 
the central bank sets the short-term cost of capital in 
response to inflation and an output measure of the business 
cycle. A main protagonist has been Charles Goodhart who 
would like models to embody realistic assumptions about 
behaviour, much as in the ‘behavioural finance’ literature, 
and fully specified models of banking and financial balance 
sheets, which then impinge on people’s behaviour. 
Recently he has been joined by Willem Buiter who has 
apologized pro vita sua as a supporter of modern macro 
(most of which is ‘useless’ he now avers). There has been 
much in the same vein from Keynesians such as Lord 
Skidelsky, Professor Vicky Chick and the ubiquitous Paul 
Krugman,. 
This headlong desire to scrap modern models must be 
resisted. Of course research improving them must continue 
and it may well that these improvements include a better 
modelling of the channels of monetary policy. But it is 
unlikely, in my view, that they will be improved by 
jettisoning their current properties; rather the extra channels 
may help by being added to this structure. 
Let us start by repeating the point above that our crises 
reflect efficient markets and the underlying nature of 
capitalism in which we expect and encourage firms and 
people to take big bets in a decentralized way — the reason 
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being that this way we get social gains from the good 
innovations which last for ever and so more than 
compensate for the bets that fail. Thus our models are 
capturing an important fact about capitalism. Furthermore, 
it is theoretically absurd in my view to assume agents are 
irrational when we make conditional forecasts of the effects 
of events and policies: they will either catch on sooner or 
later or we should ensure that they do. ‘Learning’ can also 
be modelled; but the policy implication of learning models 
is that the authorities should communicate well what they 
are doing. 
This is not to say that ‘behavioural’ models are always 
wrong, just that to rely on them systematically would be 
unwise since people have strong incentives to be rational. 
Macro-modellers gave up on ‘ad hoc’ behavioural 
assumptions precisely because they realized they would 
shift as policies developed and were well understood. 
So theoretically there are strong reasons to maintain the 
basic assumptions of modern models. But the empirical 
case turns out to be strong too. These models, when 
suitably set up, have a fairly impressive ability to mimic the 
behaviour of the economy. They are still under 
development and there are things that still need fixing for 
them to do a fully comprehensive job. But this needs to be 
put into the context of their youth in scientific terms. 
Serious efforts to use these models to match the data have 
only been going on for a decade or so. 
But what about the detailed attack on their representation of 
monetary policy? Surely it cannot be right to look merely at 
interest rates when this crisis has shown that great gaps 
have opened up between the official interest rates central 
banks set and the rates prevailing in the market-place? Do 
we not need a model of ‘monetary transmission’ which can 
predict what will occur in the market from given monetary 
actions? 
It would certainly be nice to have such a model. However, 
we should note that it has only been for the period of this 
crisis that such ‘great gaps’ (risk-premia) have appeared. 
For most of the post-war period these gaps between market 
and official rates have been fairly constant, or more 
precisely have fluctuated within a pretty narrow range of 
little importance for the economy. 
What our current modellers have done pragmatically is to 
add these risk premia directly into their equations for 
consumer and investor spending where they have their 
impacts. Thus these premia act like other sources of ‘error’ 
or ‘shock’ in the model. One can then ask what will happen 
to the economy as a result of these shocks, including the 
reaction of the central bank to developments via its base 
rate. 
The critics go on: what about the effects of ‘quantitative 
easing’? How can these be assessed in a model without 
monetary quantities? However this misses the point of the 
difficulty of assessing QE: that it is occurring at a time 
when official interest rates, the normal channel for money 
supply changes, are at their lower bound of zero. This 
difficulty is shared with models where money supply and 
demand are explicitly modelled. In effect QE is attempting 
to flood the banking and intermediary markets with cash in 
order to bring down the (risk premia) gaps between market 
rates for credit and base rates- either by stimulating normal 
bank credit and so bank money creation or by directly 
providing credit bypassing the banks and so stimulating 
activity in retail and other markets normally served by the 
banks. Both these aims share the objective of bringing 
down the risk premia in the market. 
Now we notice how QE is helping the government’s other 
policy instruments, fiscal support to banks, fiscal action via 
the automatic stabilisers to support firms and households 
(effectively with credit, since in due course the budget 
deficit will need to be paid back with tax rises of spending 
cuts), and finally ‘discretionary’ fiscal packages with 
essentially the same purpose. All these actions are 
supplementing the normal role of monetary policy in 
reducing interest rates, with the aim of extending credit to 
the private sector in a credit crisis. 
We notice that in this credit crisis the role of government is 
to provide credit where the banks are failing to provide it. 
Fiscal policy in this crisis should therefore not be analysed 
in the usual way, for its ‘multiplier effect’. The whole point 
of this crisis is that there is a serious shortage of liquidity. 
Hence fiscal actions are remedying that shortage directly. 
Hence because the credit crisis is sui generis a model built 
to analyse normal credit and intermediary operations would 
be little use. As it happens a standard macro model is able 
to examine what is going on by examining the errors in its 
equations related to the risk premia. We can ‘inject’ into 
the model ‘improving risk premia’ by altering the errors 
affecting the model. These improvements will be due to the 
joint efforts of the fiscal and QE actions; their effects on 
risk premia are easily monitored even if we cannot analyse 
just how and why they are working. 
So I would argue that in practical terms our macro models 
have served us well, if we treat the crisis and 
monetary/fiscal responses to it as a series of shocks, 
provided we are willing to accept that we cannot use them 
to understand and analyse these very shocks. I would not 
dispute that it would be good to have a model of the crisis 
itself; but that is a different thing from a macro model. 
The prospects: examining the model 
simulations of crisis and response 
To examine the prospects we divide our analysis into 
policy (monetary policy predominantly) for the period 
before the Lehman bankruptcy in mid-September 2008 
(Before Lehman); and policy After Lehman when the crisis 
deepened dramatically into a full-scale collapse of the 
world economy. We begin with an account of the model we 
are using; then consider the two periods in turn. 
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Research and a well-performing model of the EU 
In our research under our ESRC grant within the WEF 
programme, Mike Wickens and I have been examining, 
together with David Meenagh (Meenagh et al., 2008), 
whether one can find a modern theoretically well-founded 
model that can match the data over the past few decades. 
The model is for the EU as a whole (including the UK) so 
we can use it to understand average EU behaviour — our 
work on the UK on its own is not yet complete. A great 
deal of work across the world has gone into finding a 
theoretical basis that is able to fit the facts. Our work builds 
on this effort. We have taken a model of a type used widely 
by central banks around the world and made some 
adjustments to it in the light of a very thorough testing 
procedure we have developed, based on the model’s 
behaviour in response to shocks. The model we used is by 
Frank Smets at the European Central Bank (ECB) and 
Rafael Wouters at the Belgian National Bank; it is a ‘New 
Keynesian’ (NK) model, that is it embodies a high degree 
of price and wage stickiness. Its other features are habit 
persistence in consumption, variable capacity utilisation, 
and investment adjustment costs, all of which have been 
found to be helpful in matching the data. In our tests we 
found that in some respects superior performance could be 
obtained without significant price/wage stickiness — a 
‘New Classical’ (NC), flexible price, version of the same 
model. However, neither version was able to match the data 
— in brief this was because the NK model generated too 
much output (real) variability and not enough inflation and 
interest rate (nominal) variability, while the NC model did 
the opposite, producing too little real and too much nominal 
variability. So it turned out that a ‘mixed’ version worked 
best, in which firms sold their output in both a sticky price 
sector and a flexible price sector, and similarly workers 
their labour to both a sticky wage sector and a flexible 
wage sector. The mixture that fitted best was one with most 
(around 95%) of the economy flexible price/wage, and only 
a small part with price/wage rigidity; the latter part is 
sufficient to get the NC model’s nominal variability down 
and real variability up to match the data. So in what follows 
we use this mixed or ‘weighted’ model, to assess the 
shocks and policy responses. 
Before Lehman 
What are the shocks? 
Our estimates of the shocks are intended to be illustrative 
of the order of magnitude rather than in any way precise. 
We assume that commodity price inflation would have 
added about 3% to headline inflation after a year — we 
model this as an equivalent shock to productivity since 
commodity prices do not enter the model as such. 
For the credit crunch shock we assume 20% of borrowers 
were marginal and unable to obtain normal credit facilities 
after the crisis hit; we assume they could obtain credit on 
credit card terms (say around 30% p.a.) only. Other 
borrowers faced a rise in interest rates due to the inter-bank 
risk premium which has varied between 50 and 200 basis 
points during this crisis so far, as compared with a 
negligible value beforehand; there was also some switching 
of borrowers away from fixed-rate mortgages to higher 
variable rate ones. Overall, we assume these other 
borrowers faced a rise of 2% in rate costs. Averaging 
across the two categories, we get an estimated 6% per 
annum rise in average credit costs. We assume it carries on 
at this level for six quarters before gradually dying out. 
What are the possible monetary policy responses? 
To estimate the effects on the economy we have to make an 
assumption about how monetary policy reacts (i.e. the 
response of interest rates). We compare two alternative 
approaches. Under the main one, that is currently followed 
by central banks committed to inflation targets, they react 
according to a ‘Taylor Rule’ in which interest rates respond 
mainly to inflation though also somewhat to output. Under 
another one, which occasionally the ECB suggests it has in 
mind, the central bank moves interest rates to meet a fixed 
money supply growth target. 
When we run the model for these two shocks under these 
two policy assumptions we get the results shown in the six 
charts that follow: the last chart in each part show the sum 
total of effects when the two shocks are combined. In all 
our charts we show effects quarter by quarter (the 
horizontal axis measures time in quarters). On the vertical 
axis the left hand scale applies to output and shows the 
percent effect on output, the right hand scale applies to 
interest rates and inflation and shows the effect in percent 
per annum. Interest rates shown are those that consumers 
pay (i.e. under the credit crunch they include the estimated 
direct effect of the credit crunch). 
Taylor Rule results: 
Under the main Taylor Rule policy we find that interest 
rates rise substantially in response to the commodity price 
shock; this is because although there is a recessionary 
effect it is weak compared with the short-run effect on 
inflation. However, in response to the credit crunch shock 
interest rates inclusive of the credit crunch effect fall 
markedly; this is in reaction to the deflationary effect of the 
shock, creating both a sharp recession and a sharp fall in 
inflation. Since the direct effect of the credit crunch is 
initially 6 % on interest rates, to get market rates to fall 
would require an even bigger fall in base rates — in effect 
to below zero. While that is technically possible, it is in 
practice unlikely. Nevertheless it is interesting to see how 
sharply monetary policy would need to move under the 
Taylor Rule; and then of course we did not see the credit 
crunch shock in isolation. When one adds the two shocks 
together, the interest rate inclusive of the credit effect (the 
market rate, shown in the charts below) remains about 
constant — which means that official rates are cut to match 
the credit crunch effect while it is occurring; plainly this 
means large cuts in official rates (effectively to around 
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zero) in the attempt to offset the rise in interest rates 
charged for risk reasons. 
If we look at the interest rates actually set by the ECB and 
the Bank of England, it is clear that they have deviated 
substantially from this Taylor Rule prescription. They have 
barely cut base rates since August 2007. This is to be 
compared with the US Fed which has tried roughly to offset 
the tightening credit conditions with repeated cuts in its Fed 
Funds target (now set at 1%); it looks as if the Fed has 
roughly followed a Taylor Rule. 
Money Supply Rule results: 
When we apply the alternative policy of money supply 
targeting, we find rather different results. First of all, 
interest rates do not react to the commodity price shock 
because the demand for money is largely unaffected — the 
inflation rise more or less offset the drop in output. But 
secondly, interest rates inclusive of the credit crunch rise in 
response to the credit crunch; official interest rates only 
partially offset the tightening from the rising risk premium. 
This is because demand for money growth falls but to 
increase it back up to the money supply growth target only 
a small cut in interest rates is required — reflecting quite a 
substantial interest rate demand response in line with the 
sort of interest elasticity usually found (we assume here 
0.075). 
Adding the two together we find that interest rates do rise 
over the whole episode but by quite a lot less than they 
have done in actual fact in the EU, and rather more than 
they have in the US. 
Conclusions about monetary policy before Lehman 
What we can say from these estimates is that on two rules 
that have been widely suggested for monetary policy, the 
verdict on US policy is that it has been about right on one 
approach (Taylor Rule) and a bit too loose on the other 
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(Money Supply target). Whereas in the EU policy has been 
too tight on both: very much too tight on the Taylor Rule, 
rather too tight on the Money Supply target. 
The Taylor Rule is what most central banks say they are 
following and is also widely thought to be a good policy for 
containing inflation without unduly harsh effects on output. 
If we take this as our main guide it suggests that the US 
Fed got its approach to the Before Lehman episode about 
right while the ECB and the Bank of England, together 
with most other European central banks, has set policy 
quite a lot too tight. 
The ECB could reply that it pays more attention to money 
supply. Even if that is the case, on this measure here it was 
still rather too tight. The same applied to the Bank of 
England and most other European central banks. 
Where might this excessive tightness come from? It 
appears from statements by board members of these bodies 
that on the European side of the Atlantic there was  concern 
about losing credibility in the face of rising ‘headline’ 
inflation whereas on the US side of the Atlantic credibility 
was felt to be safe because ‘core inflation’ was not affected 
by the commodity price shock. 
Clearly assessing credibility requires another sort of model 
entirely — one that allows for political backlash against the 
regime of inflation targeting among other elements. But 
certainly in the context of such a severe credit shock, the 
US judgement seems to have been valid judging by events. 
Credibility has not been threatened because credit 
conditions have in effect been greatly tightened by the 
credit shock just as the commodity shock was hitting. In the 
US even the efforts of the Fed to offset the rise in credit 
costs failed to do so completely. 
Our assessment here has assumed that these two monetary 
rules represent the best practices available, based on the 
views of central bankers and their advisers. It would be 
interesting to experiment with other monetary policy rules, 
both evaluating their properties in general and in the 
context of these shocks. That is something for further work. 
After Lehman 
What distinguishes the aftermath of the Lehman 
bankruptcy from this earlier drawn-out and ambiguous 
episode that went before is that the shock and the response 
were both huge and nearly simultaneous. So it seems as if 
the economy was beset by an irresistible force and an 
immovable object at more or less the same time. 
However, it is plain on brief reflection that the two shocks 
are not on a par in terms of force. The Lehman bankruptcy 
was itself a decision of government (arguably a bad 
mistake but that does not concern us here), designed 
ironically to save the US taxpayer money from bailouts. Of 
course the crisis it caused led to far bigger bailout demands 
on that taxpayer. 
What government caused it was doomed to remedy. What 
Lehman did was suck all taxpayers everywhere into that 
remedying process, as I have argued above providing credit 
in supplementation of the normal credit channels. Just as 
government had the power to cause the crisis, so it had the 
power to more than offset it. 
Analysing the shock and counter-shock is therefore in my 
view to be seen as one negative shock followed by a larger 
positive shock with a short lag, say of about a quarter. The 
easiest way to understand the effects are to look at the 
effect of one such shock and examine the speed and shape 
of its effect. 
Before we do so we should consider the main alternative 
canvassed to the model we are using here. In our model 
there are no balance sheet effects; everything turns on 
incentives at the margin to take additional actions on 
consumption, investment, production and labour supply. 
These incentives come from prices and asset yields. 
Balance sheets only enter implicitly in the sense that there 
is a physical capital stock and it has a value which in turn 
affects investment; but its valuation is entirely forward-
looking, based on prospects of future returns from future 
consumption, investment etc. and hence on incentives. 
In the alternative model we have heard much about 
everything hangs on the state of balance sheets. It is said 
that with net assets of consumers and firms having been 
savaged by low asset prices, consumers and investors must 
necessarily retrench to ‘rebuild’ their net assets. This is said 
to be likely to take a long time, some people say decades. 
According to this model the world after Lehman could be 
headed for a long depression as balance sheets are rebuilt. 
Yet in our model this is not the case at all; bygones are 
bygones. What determines spending is the prospect of 
return. To put it crudely if I was a billionaire, now down to 
my last few millions, I do not react by doing nothing and 
hoarding what I have got, in the hope of things getting 
better without my active intervention. Rather I look at new 
opportunities to restore my fortunes. 
As we have seen earlier the model we are using is also one 
with a high degree of wage and price flexibility — recent 
wage figures have illustrated that idea, with private sector 
wages in the UK falling recently, as have recent price 
figures everywhere. So what with firms and households 
being forward-looking, responding to incentives, and 
operating in a marketplace with largely flexible wages and 
prices, it should not surprise us that it shows quite short 
lags in response to shocks. Below, in Figure 3, we show the 
effect of a worldwide banking crisis shock in a model that 
links the EU model above and a similar US model in a 
‘world economy’ model (Le et al, 2009). It is calibrated to 
produce a fall in official interest rates similar to what we 
saw.  
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What we see is that the peak effect comes quickly, by the 
second quarter. Also the monetary response comes rapidly, 
reinforcing the upswing. 
Now in this particular crisis we can think of the full 
response as being more delayed that assumed here- if one 
includes all the fiscal support and the QE measures. This 
delay will have worsened the output effect shown here for 
illustration. However, it is hard to disentangle such details; 
it must be freely admitted that in such a crisis macro 
models can only grope for orders of magnitude, shapes of 
movement and possible speeds of convergence. The basic 
point, which may be all we can make here, is that the crisis 
according to this model would be likely to be over fairly 
quickly, as it induces offsetting action on a large scale, all 
in the context of rather short lags. 
Making some sense of the whole episode — an 
attempt at an overall conclusion 
I have argued that this crisis, for all the failures of 
regulation and incentives, has to be seen as one of a line of 
capitalist crises (that look like ‘bubbles’), in which bad 
news comes hard on the heels of a long period of good 
news. The resulting crash is worse when it involves the 
banking and financial system — as often is the case since 
these are sucked by long periods of expansion into large 
credit and asset positions. 
I have also argued that as crisis it is likely soon to be over, 
because due to government action worsening it, 
governments everywhere were forced into a massive 
response. 
However, this still leaves unclear what bad news it was that 
precipitated the end of the world expansion fed by the good 
news since 1992. As I argued above the main factor 
significant for the economy is productivity; this drives 
production, consumption and housing demand in particular, 
all symptoms of the underlying productivity success. It is 
not hard to see the huge exploitation of the computer as the 
engine of this long productivity miracle. 
What brought this process to a shuddering halt during 
2008? We saw during 2007 and 2008 a dramatic upsurge in 
commodity prices, especially oil. It began to become clear 
that with emerging market economies like China growing 
at up to 10 percent a year the demands for commodities 
would quickly outrun supplies. A similar thing had 
happened in the 1970s; but this triggered large-scale 
substitution away from the use of oil and other scarce raw 
materials so that by the 1990s commodity prices languished 
at nugatory levels and substitution slowed with them. But 
by the late 2000s this slowing substitution had been 
overtaken again by the massive growth in the decade and 
half from 1992. Productivity growth fuelled by the 
computer hit a wall of raw material shortage again. For it to 
Figure 3: Deterministic Credit Crunch Shock to Both EU and US 
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restart will require productivity growth in raw material 
technology — i.e. more substitution. 
So in final conclusion it is not possible to see a return to the 
rapid growth rate of the world in the mid 2000s until 
productivity growth has spread to eliminate the new 
scarcity of raw materials. While the crisis should be over 
soon, and indeed is probably already over, the immediate 
macro prospect is for a return to moderate growth in line 
with the restraint placed on productivity growth by current 
raw material shortage. 
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